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Granatstein: Conscription and My Politics

J.L. Granatstein

W

hen I graduated from the Royal
Military College in 1961, I wanted
to do American history in graduate
school and to write about Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal. But I was
advised by my RMC professors that US
history was too crowded a field and that
Roosevelt had been overdone (amazing
that they could have said that in 1961!).
"There was more room in Canadian history," they
said. So, ever obedient, I went off to the
University of Toronto on leave without pay from
the Army to do an MA and was fortunate enough
to find myself in John Saywell's superb class in
Canadian political history. I didn't have a topic
in mind and asked Saywell to suggest something.
"How about the Communist Party in World War
II?", he said, adding that no one had yet done
that. I duly began to read into the subject and
went to Party headquarters on Cecil Street in
Toronto and asked if I could read their files. After
some hesitation, the party officials agreed, and
I began. It suddenly hit me that I was a young
officer in the Canadian Army and it might not
help my career to be spending afternoons on
Cecil Street. So I telephoned the Intelligence
officer at Central Command Headquarters in
Oakville and asked him what to do. "Call
Sergeant X at RCMP headquarters," he said, so
I did. The Sergeant was not happy with me but
promised to get back, and he soon did. I had
been checked out and was OK; so had Saywell,
and he wasn't a pinko, like so many professors
at Toronto. And I could write on the Party
providing that each time I came out of the Party
headquarters, I was de-briefed.
This seemed a bit burdensome when all I
wanted to do was to secure my MA, so I went to
see Saywell, apologized for being the cause of
his being investigated, and asked him to suggest
a new subject. "How about the Conservative Party
in the Second World War?", he shot back. "No
one has done that either." So there I was, saved
from being trapped in the sectarian ghetto of

Marxism, and the subject of the Tories
led inexorably to conscription.
To look at t h e Tories m e a n t
examining how a party self-destructed
over conscription, over the legacy of the
Great War, and over the insistence of
former Prime Minister, Senator and
once and future wartime party leader
Arthur Meighen on repeating past
history. To Meighen and those who thought like
him, French Canadians were slackers, and the
Liberals were soft on winning the war, on
conscription, and on Quebec. And, of course,
working on the Conservative Party in World War
II led necessarily to seeing just how Mackenzie
King beat the Tories, kept Quebec behind him,
and the conscription issue under control. King
had learned from the Great War experience, and
the Conservatives and Arthur Meighen had not.
Now this was in the early 1960s just as the
Quiet Revolution was getting underway. I had
some understanding of Quebec, I thought,
because I had gone to College Militaire Royal de
St-Jean and lived in the province for three years.
I was even - briefly - bilingual. I was predisposed
to be sympathetic to the modernization of
Quebec then underway, and the work I had done
on the Conservative Party during the war showed
me how necessary it was for a Canadian party
to understand Quebec and to come to terms with
its reality.
Then from 1963 to 1966 I was in the United
States at graduate school at Duke University. My
PhD thesis topic was an expansion of the work I
had done for Saywell - eventually published in
1967 as The Politics of Survival: The
Conservative party 1939-1945. I was hired at
York in 1966, the same year I left the Army where
I had worked at the Directorate of History at
National Defence Headquarters. As the author
of a book on the Conservatives - there were few
others - I found myself participating in the party
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leadership convention of 1967, though I was
never a party member. Nonetheless, I was against
John Diefenbaker and against his idea of "One
Canada" which I interpreted as a code word for
putting Quebec in its place. And I supported the
"deux nations" line that was espoused at the
Tories' Montmorency policy convention and the
Toronto leadership convention. I can remember
trying to explain what this meant to skeptical
Prairie delegates, and there is no doubt in my
m i n d t h a t it w a s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
conscription and the Second World War that
shaped my attitudes. And when Robert Stanfield,
a moderate, intelligent man, was selected as
leader and Diefenbaker was dumped, I rejoiced.
But Stanfield was not to become Prime
Minister. The Liberals chose Pierre Trudeau in
1968, and he swept to power. I was not a
supporter - I was resolutely NDP in my politics
even though I had participated in the Tory
convention of 1967 - but I was infuriated by the
way some older Canadians complained about
Trudeau's failure to serve in the military during
the war, exactly the way Tories had complained
about Mackenzie King's lack of military service
during the Great War (but never Meighen's
similar decision to stay in politics at home). This
was anti-Trudeau, anti-Quebec racism, I was
convinced. And even though 1 had gone to RMC
and served in the peacetime Army, I was against
the Vietnam War, then tearing the US apart. I
have no doubt at all that this reinforced my anticonscription attitudes. I had seen friends at
Duke desperately seeking ways not to be drafted,
and I had met many young US military officers
there who were just as desperately eager for a
chance to fight. I sided with those who did not
want to go.
My attitudes were reinforced by my research
on the King government during World War II,
the research that eventually became Canada's
War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King
Government, 1939-1945, published in 1974.
This research simply confirmed King's political
genius for me because of the skillful way he had
balanced the interests of English and French
Canada during the hard days of war. Keeping
the country together was his aim, and wartime
pressures posed the worst threat to unity. He
had succeeded, fending off the Opposition but
also the u n t h i n k i n g - as I saw t h e m conscriptionists in his own party: Defence
minister J. Layton Ralston and Navy minister
36
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Angus L. Macdonald and others. All the Liberals
had been shaped by their Great War experience
- Ralston had been a battalion commander in
Flanders - and clearly all the attitudes of the
Second World War had emerged from the Great
War. History lived, history repeated.
After that book on the King government, I
decided to write a history of conscription with
J.M. Hitsman (who regrettably died while the
book was in process). Now it will not surprise
you that as I turned to look in depth at the Great
War for the first time, I was already convinced
that conscription was a bad thing. Nothing that
I turned up in my research convinced me
otherwise. There was the country's colonial
relationship with Great Britain - and no good
reason why Quebec should buy into that; there
was the generally poorer health and earlier
marriage age of Quebec men; there were the
recruiting bungles of Militia minister Sam
Hughes; and there was what I saw as the straightout racism of English Canada. The election of
1917 was to me the nadir - with the charges in
the press that if Laurier won, he'd win leading
the cockroaches of the kitchen of Canada to
victory; the claims that the Kaiser would cheer
if trie Liberals and anti-conscription forces won;
and the charges from otherwise intelligent men
that French Canadians were, because of their
failure to enlist in the requisite numbers,
innately cowards. I found this simply repellent,
and what I wrote reflected my distaste. Indeed, I
said in the preface of Broken Promises: A History
of Conscription in Canada, published in 1976,
that I fervently hoped that my children would
never be conscripted for anyone's war. And I
meant it.
Now my position was unquestionably based
on my research - and also on the era in which I
was living. I didn't support Trudeau politically,
but I agreed with the Official Languages Act, and
I looked with some pleasure at the rise of
Quebec's self-confidence. I shared the view that
Quebec had real grievances in Confederation.
Conscription, after all, was one, the attempt of
English Canada to make everyone fight Toronto's
view of what the wars should be. I had been on
the editorial board of The Canadian Forum
which took a benign view of the possibility of
Quebec independence, and I had vehemently
opposed the imposition of the War Measures Act
in the October Crisis of 1970. The Vietnam War
was over by the time I wrote Broken Promises,
2
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but its effects were still being felt. There is no
doubt that these things shaped my approach.
Yes, I believe that the evidence also supported
the view I took, but the times, I now think, were
just as important.
What began to change my mind? The times,
for one. I might be a bit slow, but I suddenly
came to realize in 1980 that Rene Levesque, a
man I thought the most attractive politician in
Canada, wanted to split the nation. I still
remember going on a trip to do research at
Bishop's University in Lennoxville, Quebec in the
Spring of 1980 during the Referendum campaign
and suddenly realizing that those bastards
wanted to tear apart my country. The times they
were a-changing for me - and for Canadians.
But what definitively swung me around was
the publication of Tug of War: The Canadian
Victory that Opened Antwerp, by Denis and
Shelagh Whitaker in 1984. Whitaker had been a
brave and much decorated officer in the Royal
Hamilton Light Infantry in World War II, and his
book on the Scheldt campaign of the fall of 1944
opened my eyes. As an infantry officer, Whitaker
understood, as I had not, that men serving in
understrength units were in serious danger. I
had jeered at the 24,132 conscripts who had
arrived in France by the Armistice in November
1918 as meaning nothing when we had enlisted
625,000 volunteers in all. I had dismissed the
16,000 NRMA men sent overseas as result of
the conscription crisis of 1944 as meaningless

when Canada had 750,000 men in khaki. I was
wrong. The 24,000 Great War conscripts were
enough to sustain the Canadian Corps for at least
6 months of heavy fighting; 16,000 home defence
conscripts would have met First Canadian
Army's reinforcement needs through the rest of
the war.
The reason why this mattered only became
clear to me after reading Whitaker's book. The
casualties fell on the infantry in disproportionate
numbers. An infantry battalion of 950 men could
lose one-third of its men in a day, and every loss
of trained soldiers, of brave soldiers - it was the
bravest who suffered the most casualties - left
the sections and platoons and companies
understrength. A section often could be reduced
to five in a second; a platoon of 30 could be at
15 in a day; a company of 120 could be reduced
to 60. That understrength section, platoon, and
company, that weakened battalion, had to cover
the same ground and mount the same attacks.
And with fewer men, the casualties increased.
In other words, trained infantry reinforcements
were essential to keep units up to strength and
to minimize casualties. And as the army
struggled in October 1944 to keep its units up
to strength, it re-mustered men from other
corps to the infantry. Whitaker was scathing
as he explained that such men had forgotten
or never knew much about infantry fighting they simply didn't know how to arm a grenade
or fire a Br en gun. They were a danger to the
experienced infantry, and they were quick to
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become casualties. (Trained men, General
Chris Vokes once said, had a 75 percent chance
of survival; untrained had none.) This was
especially hard on French Canadian units,
which had to scrape even harder for men
because of relatively lower enlistments - and
had to take on English-speaking officers
because there were so few French-speaking.
The Whitaker book changed my mind about
conscription and removed the blinkers from my
eyes. I was a (peacetime) soldier, but I had simply
not factored in the risks to the men in the field.
I h a d not made the connection between
conscription and the front, between a hundred
trained reinforcements and the success of a
battalion in operations. It is also true that I was
predisposed to have my mind changed. The
Vietnam War was long over, and I had become
interested again in current defence policy and
appalled by the state of the Canadian Forces. I
was remembering my RMC and army roots.
Moreover, I was unhappy with the Quebec
bargaining position on the constitution and
increasingly unsympathetic - indeed, straight out
opposed - to Quebec independentist ideas and
arguments which I viewed as based on lies and
misrepresentations. In other words, the new
information - new to me - in Whitaker fed into
my growing dislike for Quebec's aspirations. And
that led me to re-appraise my position on
conscription.
Now was this bad? I think not. It is a good
thing for historians to constantly re-assess their
interpretations, and I make no apology for that.
But I do wish I had been as aware as I am now
of the extent to which contemporary politics had
shaped my attitudes and approaches.
I think my awareness of this is most evident
in The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior
Commanders in the Second World War which I
published in 1993. This is, I think, just about
the best thing I have written, and certainly it was
the easiest - the book just about wrote itself. In
it, I came to terms with the impact RMC had on
my personality and life, and I wrote my most
balanced interpretation of conscription. In one
chapter, I looked at two generals who had served
with distinction in the Great War - Maurice Pope
and Ken Stuart. Pope was half-French Canadian
and the military adviser to Mackenzie King, with
two sons overseas; Stuart was the former Chief
of the General Staff and senior officer at
38
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Canadian Military Headquarters in Britain who
many deem responsible for the conscription
crisis of 1944. Pope saw that conscription could
split the country, and he overcame his worries
for his sons to argue strongly against it in
November 1944. Stuart innately favoured
conscription but had said it would not be
necessary; then when casualties mounted and
reinforcements dried up, he changed his mind
and argued its necessity. Both men tried to act
in good conscience; both put their definition of
country and nation first; and both were correct.
If I had fallen prey to the temptation to let
contemporary events shape my history in the
past, in The Generals, I think, I overcame it.
But the lesson you should draw from this is
that the present shapes our understanding of
the past. I am resolutely anti-ideological, and I
dismiss Marxism and Marxist approaches to
history as nothing but Groucho Marxism. I
believe now as I have always done that the sole
task of a historian is to try to understand what
happened and why. But I know now that my
politics, shifting and changing as I applied my
analyses to events as I lived them, shaped what
I wrote as a historian. I am not sure if I could
have avoided this or even if this should be
avoided. I only know what I did not in 1967,
1974, and 1976 - that events in which I was a
participant or observer determined to some
substantial extent what I wrote. I doubt we can
protect against this; we can, however, be aware
of it, and that at least should play a part in how
we read what historians have written.
The former director of the Canadian War
M u s e u m , J.L. G r a n a t s t e i n h a s j u s t
completed a history of the Canadian Army
to be published by University of Toronto
Press in 2002
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